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1 Introduction
In 1991 Jaap van den Herik published his seminal inaugural address as a profes-
sor of legal informatics at Leiden University.1 He discussed the question whether
computers can adjudicate. Not Van den Herik’s arguments were feverishly con-
tested at the time, but his audacity to bring the question onto the Dutch legal
academic fore at all. Ever since, it has been his adopted mission to emphasize
over and over again that computers are and will be capable of much more than
we are willing to imagine. He is right. And he is also right in expecting our
societies to be caught unaware if we do not take this phenomenon as a serious
matter of concern.2
Van den Herik’s inaugural lecture ended by a double note. One note gained
the larger part of the public’s attention and concerned the proposition that
computers will be capable of adjudicating in a better way than human judges
will do in the future. This may be a question of several centuries (he tentatively
mentions the year 2984), but it will happen eventually. Van den Herik is willing
to take any bet on it. And as he has already won his bet with Hans Bo¨hm on a
computer gaining victory in a serious game of chess against the reigning world
champion, few of us dare take him on.
As predicting the future may be interesting entertainment, it is not the tack
I choose to pursue. Here, I want to take up the other note by Van den Herik
as stated in 1991. If we do accept, as a working hypothesis, that computers
are capable of adjudication, then we have to address the question whether we
let them do so, or even promote them to adjudicate. In brief, assuming that
computers are capable to adjudicate, we face the new question: ought they?
Ought computers adjudicate if they can? This is the question I want to address
in my essay. And by doing so, I would like to pay tribute to the man who set
me on this track.
? Aernout Schmidt is a full professor of law and IT at the Department of Metajuridica
of Leiden University. Email: a.h.j.schmidt@law.leidenuniv.nl.
1 H.J. van den Herik, Kunnen Computers rechtspreken? Arnhem: Gouda Quint bv
1991.
2 As it is always dangerous to phrase any thought, I want to stress that I am trying
to avoid technical terminology. Consequently, any resemblance of my words with
technical terms is coincidental. “Matters of concern,” for instance, is meant to mean
what it means to people who manage without reading Bruno Latour.
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2 Conjecture
Let me hasten to state that the foregoing does not imply that I agree with
everything in Van den Herik’s inaugural address. One of the reasons to address
the current question is the wording Van den Herik chose for his concluding
proposition: “after three months of impeccable computer-adjudication advice,
the computer becomes the adjudicator, irrespective of what each one of them
may think about the matter” (p. 33, my translation). This is not a speculation
about what computers are capable of, but about how complex social institutions
will react to challenges posed by innovation. Admittedly, I am not a neoclassical
economist, but I doubt that the implicit reasoning — which seems to be re-
lated to the efficiency-effectiveness brand — is valid. Looking at the chess scene,
for instance, I do not see any analogous prediction to become true. Although
computers are capable of high-level chess-playing and although computer-chess
competitions do exist, there is little evidence that “people-chess” competitions
are being displaced by computer-chess competitions at any level or scale. Not
even at those levels where generally affordable chess programs are available. So,
I venture to suggest that there might be other than economic reasons that pre-
vent our natural laziness to take over and let computers run chess competitions
on their own, on our behalf, thus setting us free to do more important things.
Apparently, some values are simply not fit for delegation. Individual, existential
pleasure (as may be involved in playing a game of chess) may be one of them.
The topos of ignorance I want to address encompasses many interesting ques-
tions of which I would like to single out the following: are there inherent aspects
in our adjudicatory arrangements that will prevent us from accepting agency
(proxy, delegation) relationships with computers to act as judiciary on our be-
halves? My working plan is as follows: (1) specify the domain of discourse and
(2) discuss several imaginary “refutations” against the proposition that comput-
ers ought to adjudicate as soon as they consistently outperform human judges.
We have, after all, no better scientific approach available than to frame our ig-
norance in concepts, look around us, concoct “risky” (falsifiable) conjectures,
and apply adequate observations, valuations, and reasoning methods, in search
of refutations.3
3 K. Popper. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Kegan Paul, 1963. Although al-
most anywhere else accepted as a sound (empirical) scientific approach, in legal
academics it is quite eccentric — or rather, it has somehow become almost entirely
obsolete nowadays. This trend is very difficult to understand when we take into con-
sideration that a substantive part of legal scientific and philosophical work still in
print and read seriously rests on empirical observation and argument (e.g., Hobbes
(Leviathan, 1652), Montesquieu (De l’Esprit des Lois, 1748), Rousseau (Du Contrat
Social,1762), Smith (An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Na-
tions, 1776), Bentham (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
1789), Mill (On Liberty, 1859), Popper (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1943),
Hart (The Concept of Law, 1961), Fuller (The Morality of Law, 1963) and Rawls (A
Theory of Justice, 1971) ). Perhaps as a result of the current dominance (and among
legal scientists common misreading) of the “naturalistic fallacy” that is generally
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3 Ought Judges Adjudicate?
It is no more than reasonable to start and approach the question “ought comput-
ers adjudicate?” in a traditional conceptual manner, which immediately suggests
that we expect to find applicable conceptualizations in traditional arguments.
This brings our attention to a question so seldom asked, that it may produce un-
predictable reactions in the reader’s mind. The mere formulation of the question
“ought judges adjudicate?” may at first sight be considered irreverent, outlandish
or downright dangerous — but never irrelevant in this context. If we know why
judges ought to adjudicate, we also know some relevant functional requirements
that may help to decide the issue under which conditions we ought to let com-
puters take over.
So why is it, that in the legal discipline (of which I am now for more than 35
year a member) I have never heard this question at all, and, consequently, never
heard it seriously discussed? Almost all professional legal attention is directed
towards issues of how judges should adjudicate, not whether judges should do
so. The proposition that judges should adjudicate is one of the fundamental
assumptions the legal discipline is built upon. The very question shakes this
assumption and answering it may consequently shake the entire discipline. For
a discipline averse to being shaken, the question is not attractive. And whether
judges should adjudicate is a dangerous question indeed. Equally dangerous is
the question whether computers ought to adjudicate; perhaps the latter is even
more dangerous, as we might reach in theory the conclusion that neither judges
nor computers are fit for adequate adjudication. Certainly you might agree —
I assume — that it would not only create the risk of some serious additional
instability in our legal arrangements, it would also raise the related question:
why do we need adjudicatory functionality to be organized in our societies at
all? Let me start from there.
4 Framing Adjudicatory Organization
Interestingly, the most general argument on why we need organization at all can
be harvested from an economic publication by Ronald Coase (1937)4 — from an
article so beautifully simple that it took more than 50 years before it drew suffi-
cient attention to assign him a Nobel Memorial Award — in 1991 as a matter of
fact, the very year of Van den Herik’s inaugural lecture. The argument is almost
self-evident once the right question is available. Coase’s question concerned the
considered to flaw any attempt to derive that what ought to be from that what is,
and rightly so (Hume/Moore). What the legal discipline seems to forget, however, is
that this naturalistic fallacy is equally valid for any attempt to derive anything that
will be from what is (or has been) — and that Popper’s approach to the growth of
science, which is surely an empiricist one, was designed to avoid it. For who, as I
do, accepts the assumption that what ought to be may be formulated as a (legal)
behavioral theory, Popper’s approach is equally valid.
4 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4 (November 1937): 386-405.
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existence of hierarchically organized firms in the face of the fundamental eco-
nomic assumption that only the market (the space for unorganized exchange)
is optimally efficient. How can it be that we observe some organizations to be
more efficient than the unorganized market, if we assume the market to provide
optimal efficiency? Coase suggests that the costs of knowledge gathering and
consolidation, of specialization, of agency, and of long-term agreements may be
less than those involved in ‘spot market’ transactions, where each and every
transaction is burdened by the need to fulfil cumbersome information require-
ments and to (re)do comparisons and evaluations. As a result, organization has
begun to matter in economic models5 and the assumption that theories of mar-
ket efficiency may ignore information costs (and may naively accept the two-part
assumption that each market player (i) is omniscient of the market’s supplies
and (ii) has a peculiar form of amnesia concerning earlier dealings) has been
shaken considerably.
So far, so good. Coase provides an argument for legitimacy of economic or-
ganization. Is this argument also fit for a fruitful discussion on the legitimacy of
judiciary organization? Can the argument be generalized?
Coase’s argument may very well be generalized as follows. Organization may
be preferred to individual ad hoc behavior, when the overall value-return pro-
vided by the organization outperforms the overall value-investment, required to
organize. As soon as this is no longer the case, an organization loses its overall
legitimacy and its existential foundation. This generalization suggests that there
may be different reciprocity “equations” for different value types that are linked
to organizational goals. “Not just for the money” as Bruno Frey suggests6 and
as the persistent existence of lower-level “people-chess” competitions shows. In
the approach suggested, the values exchanged in the overall reciprocity equation
of a chess competition would be of the form (1) against (2), viz. (1) the aggre-
gated values of “the opportunity to play regularly against interesting players”
against (2) the aggregated values of “individual fees.” This equation would not
be influenced by “computer-chess” competitions at all as these simply do not
occur in the valuation equation concerned.
The complexity and the vagueness of my statements above make me wonder
whether the readers are still with me. Therefore, I will try to rephrase my state-
ments in the form of a semi-formal model. My discussion aims at an appropriate
conceptualization for scientific refutation attempts against the proposition that
computers ought to adjudicate if they perform consistently better than human
judges. I argued earlier that this should be a question about agency (proxy,
delegation) and hierarchical organization. I then suggested that there are value
costs and value benefits in a reciprocity relation between any organization (act-
ing on a public’s behalf) and that public. I showed that these values need not
necessarily be fit for proxy and that they need not always be expressible in nu-
merical variables. Moreover, I suggested that reciprocity relationships express
5 E.g., O. E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Dis-
crete Structural Alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 1991, p. 269-296.
6 Bruno S. Frey, Not Just For the Money, Cheltenham: Keagan Paul, 1997.
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the legitimacies of organizations, thus potentially offering a decision procedure
(if adequately instantiated) to decide any question regarding a proxy. Let me try
to outline the decision procedure and summarize the foregoing in a model. I will
use four equations, one for overall or aggregated legitimacy of an organization
and three for internal or local legitimacies.
The overall, aggregated legitimacy ALoc of organization O in community
C may be expressed in an equation, relating (1) the aggregated organizational
value return f [R]oc and (2) the aggregated organizational value investment:
g[I]oc:
ALoc = f [R]oc − g[I]oc, (1)
where an organization loses overall legitimacy as soon as ALoc < 0.
It should be stressed that the aggregation functions f and g are specific
to the OC-contingent variable sets [R]oc and [I]oc (which represent the “data
models” framing the values that describe the value returns and the value invest-
ments). These values need not be expressible in dollars. [Of course this raises
a problem. It will be discussed later.] As I am now at the stage of formulat-
ing some semi-formal conceptualizations for organizational legitimacy, I want to
address how the other existential aspect of legitimacy may be modeled. I refer
to the concept of internal or local legitimacy. Local legitimacies (LL) concern
equations that venture to express the related notions of organizational fairness,
distributive justice, and corruption. It recognizes that even positive overall le-
gitimacy may internally show such inequality in the distribution of investments
and returns over the executives (E), the other functionaries (F), and the publics
(P) of an organization, that it may fall apart due to loss of internal legitimacy.
For this argument I accept three local legitimacies, one for the executives of the
organization:
LLoce = f [Re]oc − g[Ie]oc, (2)
one for the functionaries of the organization:
LLocf = f [Rf]oc − g[If]oc, (3)
and one for the public of the organization:
LLocp = f [Rp]oc − g[Ip]oc. (4)
I complete the decision procedure by adding the requirement that an organiza-
tion loses local legitimacy if one of the equations (2) to (4) has a negative value.
The reason is self-evident. Any hierarchical organization needs a management,
needs a work force, and needs publics (customers, consumers, members, citizens,
subjects, believers, whatever). So, any hierarchical organization will lose local
legitimacy (or part of its overall legitimacy) when any one of them loses legit-
imacy. I consider any argument to be a refutation when it shows that any of
these equations (concerning judiciary organization in a jurisdiction) necessarily
has a negative outcome when instantiating computers for judges.
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5 Refutations
Let me now proceed by discussing some imaginary refutations. I have selected
four of them. The first two (Against the law? Against the Rule of Law? ) follow the
lines of mainstream legal scientific practice and claim to lead to the conclusion
that adjudication by computers ought not be allowed as it is against both the
law and the rule of law. The third one (Inherent incommensurability? ) claims
that the values in our reciprocity equations are inherently incommensurable
and thus prevent adequate algorithmic modeling. The last one (An unavoidable
trap? ) claims that judges generate propositions about what ought to be, and that
replacing them with model-based computing will inescapably involve application
of the naturalistic fallacy.
5.1 Against the Law?
Mainstream legal argumentation will look at valid law for answers to ought-to
questions employing valid legal reasoning. As it is impossible to find valid law
allowing computers to adjudicate (as, for instance, Dutch law implicitly requires
judges to be human by explicitly requiring an affidavit of decent behavior before
anyone can be appointed as a judge), we seem to encounter a serious refutation.
However.7
The legal reasoning involved needs to be valid and what lines of legal reason-
ing are valid has been researched and commented upon extensively. It is not
my aim to enter into the quagmire of legal-academic dispute in this area of ju-
risprudence. For making my point here I need some practical characteristics to
break down the field heuristically, so that I can make use of a generalized legal
approach. I use two dimensions for this, irreverently and mercilessly8 borrowed
from the work of the constitutional law scholar Bobbitt9 and the psychologist
Fodor10 respectively. Bobbitt analyzed the types of arguments used during the
history of constitutional review in the USA and comes up with a limitative11
list: historical (addressing the intentions of the rule makers), textual (address-
ing the present sense of the rule wording), doctrinal (addressing the principles
and relations derived from precedent), prudential (self-consciously addressing
the role and position of the party or institution that is ruling), structural (ad-
dressing the implicit meaning from the existence and role of legal institutions)
and ethical (arguments addressing the ethos of a12 jurisdiction or politeia).
7 The following part (in smaller typeset) is an auto-citation from a contribution (to-
gether with H. Franken) to H. Snijders and S. Weatherill (eds.) E-commerce Law,
Kluwer Law International, 2003 (p. 123-124).
8 Irreverently, because put to use in a very blunt, practical and generalizing way that
does not and cannot respect the finesses of their fine work.
9 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate — theory of the constitution, Oxford University
Press 1982.
10 J.A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, MIT press 1987.
11 Despite his claim not to be exhaustive on p. 8, the exercise proposed on pp. 94 and
95 suggests the opposite (Bobbitt, o.c.)
12 Here I generalize Bobbitt’s typology — he mentions the ethos of American polity.
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Fodor is interested in natural and in artificial intelligence and in how human
knowledge representation relates to knowledge representation in IT. He finds
the distinctions of abstraction layers as a basic similarity and considers the
positioning of abstraction layers relative to reasoning of fundamental impor-
tance. Imposing Fodor’s abstraction layers upon legal argument I suggest six
layers: common beliefs (like in a free market, the ten commandments, being re-
sponsible for one’s acts), principles (like in human rights, in the constitution),
rules (like in legislation, for instance democratically formulating exceptions to
human rights), policies (like in administrative plans, interchange agreements
and common-law precedent), individual judgments (like in civil-law precedent,
in transactions) and facts (making up the facts of a case).
Types of argument can be related to levels of abstraction in the framework as
presented in Table 1. The framework may help to analyze legal reasoning and
to present a heuristic distinction between valid and invalid legal reasoning in
the different contexts. First of all, the different levels of abstraction represent
different sources for legal arguments. In mainstream legal analysis, only facts,
judgments, policies, rules and principles are valid sources for argument, and
only that legal reasoning is valid that brings facts within the constraints of valid
judgments, that are within the constraints of valid policies, that are within the
constraints of valid rules, that are within the constraints of valid principles. In
normal circumstances, common beliefs do not provide valid sources for legal
argument (indicated in Table 1 by ). Moreover, ethical arguments are also
not admissible (indicated by ) — anyway, within a stable politeia, arguments
at the common-belief level and arguments of the ethical type are most often
coherent with valid legal reasoning.
Table 1. A framework for analyzing legal reasoning
History Text Doctrine Prudence Structure Ethics
Beliefs      
Principles 
Rules 
Policies 
Judgments 
Facts 
Now the main flaw in the refutation suggested concerns the assumption that
the legal rules and policies of today will remain valid in the future. Legal rules
and policies are adapted all the time, however. The argument that today’s law
will rule tomorrow’s world is simply inaccurate. And, in the reciprocity equation
where the value of organized scientific argument is weighed against the invest-
ment to read, argue and be convinced, inaccurate arguments are not sufficient.
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5.2 Against the Rule of Law?
The second refutation expresses the concern that computers do neither have per-
sonality nor morality, and that we consequently need human judges to guard the
morality of our legal systems. This refutation stems from the second perspec-
tive in legal academics: jurisprudence or legal theory. It is of the meta-juridical
type and focuses on the quality of legal systems as such. Its results13 yield (the
discussion of) existential conditions for legal-system quality and may be seen as
recommendations which provide specifics for the reciprocity equations mentioned
earlier.
The Rule of Law and its moralities are central issues. A practical approach
towards an operationalization of legal-system morality can be realized by in-
stantiating the rule of law with Fuller’s list14, supplemented by two additional
requirements, on system-role organization15 and on reciprocity.16 Let me explain
somewhat further:17
The Rule of Law refers to a working, minimumly decent legal system in a
minimumly decent society. As Tamanaha shows in his recent book, the ’Rule of
Law’ concept is currently not only a very popular one, it is also widely abused
as an argument by governments of various reputation to expect civilians to
comply with their rules.18 On top of that, it is an elusive concept. Almost
everyone using it means something different. I need a working notion and
thus start with the question of which normative systems are minimally decent
law systems. Fuller (1969) specifies eight necessary moralities of duty in this
context:
(a) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if it does not have any
general rules at all;
(b) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if the rules are unavailable
to the addressee;
(c) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if legal practice shows
abuse of retroactive legislation;
(d) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if the rules are not under-
standable to the addressee;
13 E.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised edition, Yale University Press
1967, John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press 1999 and Brian Z.
Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press 2004.
14 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, (1967 ed.) and Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule
of Law, (2004).
15 The requirement of adequate system-role organization (separation of powers a´ la
Montesquieu) is, after all, a cornerstone of Western jurisprudence. It is consequently
an important concept in (formal) comparative analysis.
16 Reciprocity is considered fundamental in virtually every (Western) political and
socio-economical theory, including those proposed by Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Smith,
Fuller, Hayek, Rawls, Coase, Searle and Pessers.
17 The following part (in smaller typeset) is an auto-citation from a contribution to
Aernout Schmidt, Wilfred Dolfsma and Wim Keuvelaar, Fighting the War on File
Sharing, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2007 (p. 159-161).
18 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, 2004.
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(e) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if the enactment of rules
is contradictory;
(f) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if rules require conduct
which is beyond the powers of the addressed party;
(g) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if rules are subject to
changes so often that subjects cannot orient their actions thereto;
(h) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if there exists incongruence
between the rules and their administration.
I picked Fuller’s list because it conveys a well-founded, non-controversial set
of formal conditions that can be used as a simple checklist for the existence
of a minimally decent law system. Fuller’s list has nevertheless been seriously
criticized as underspecific. I agree and add another non-controversial condition
to Fuller’s list: the condition of adequate institutional roles /‘a la Montesquieu:
(i) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if it does not show in its
elites the three interdependent roles (legislation, adjudication, administra-
tion) as addressed in the maxim of the separation of powers.
These nine conditions have been considered to provide a formal description of
the Rule of Law. Still, they have as such been subject to additional criticism,
mostly because they would allow some very unsavory systems inside the do-
main of minimally decent law systems. Again, I agree and will consequently
add one other, non-controversial condition to the list:
(j) there cannot be a minimally decent law system if it does not show at
least one effective procedure for feedback, supporting reciprocity in the
relationships between the law system’s elites and the law system’s subjects.
What we have thus far is the definition of what I consider to be a minimally
decent legal system, and as such it is an articulation on paper. I need the
following closing condition:
(k) there is a minimally decent law system if, and only if, it shows itself in
accordance with conditions (a)–(j) in practice.
By now, I have some background to confront the refutation that since com-
puters do not have morality, they cannot function as a legal-system elite that
guards legal-system morality. The theory suggests that some form of minimal
legal-system morality will be the emergent result of complying with the 10 for-
mal rules mentioned above. Of these, only five relate to the judiciary: (c), (e),
(h), (i), and (j). The first three of these can hardly play a role in the refutation
under discussion as computers are considered functionally superior to humans
where it concerns rule-compliant (c) or consistent behavior (e, h).
The fourth formal rule protecting minimal morality of our legal systems (i)
requires a judiciary that is sensitive to legislatory feedback and does not a priori
stipulate anything preventing computers to play the part. The reasoning behind
the separation of powers, however, does require the behavior of the judiciary to
be sensitive to legislatory input and to be receptive to feedback information. As a
consequence, if computers are to play the role of judiciary, they must be designed
in a manner allowing the legislator to change their behavior accordingly. As
solutions are conceivable (e.g., designing intelligent maintenance algorithms or by
appointing what Bovens has coined “system bureaucrats”) I do not consider this
a valid refutation. [The argument that it will be impossible to foresee what these
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inputs will be (and it thus will be impossible to model adequate maintenance
algorithms) is outside our domain of discourse as it is our working hypothesis
that computers in fact can completely replace the human judiciary.]
The last formal rule protecting minimal morality of our legal systems (j)
requires that there exists at least one feedback relation between the judiciary
and the adjudicated. The related refutation often refers to the essential need
for empathic relationships in adjudicatory arrangements. In this line of thought,
adjudicational arrangements are inherently real-time and interactive. The refu-
tation is interesting, but hardly persistent. In the current practice we already
see that these requirements are being adapted to the emerging IT-possibilities.
An even stronger argument recognizes that empathy is hardly to the point for
the feedback requirement. A poorly motivated judicial opinion is poor feedback,
irrespective of whether or not some empathy is shown by the judge. This ’Rule
of Law’ refutation does not prevail as the value of empathy is secondary to the
value of feedback accuracy.
5.3 Inherent Incommensurability?
In order to be able to employ the decision-procedure equations, we need to know
what values are parts of them. As suggested earlier, the economic or monetary
perspective may be inadequate, as we may even want to delegate adjudicatory
authority to human organizations without experiencing any direct financial re-
turn. I, for instance, have never in my life had the need for any court’s opinion.
And although I know quite well that part of the taxes I pay are spent on our
judiciary, I do not feel any lack of fairness here. After all, the very existence of a
decent court system has value, and may even be considered a necessary condition
for public stability in a society, where corruption and crime are kept at large and
where families, cultural institutions, and economic markets may flourish. Thus,
I am willing to contribute not only financially to our legal system, but also in
freedoms — by refraining from unlawful acts and by accepting judiciary author-
ity. Now, if economic organizational exchange can be measured with a monetary
yardstick (prices and welfare), adjudicatory organizational exchange might con-
sider the balance between the values of authorities and freedoms transferred on
the one side and the values of power-application practices and securities returned
on the other side.19 To let computers provide quality adjudication we need to
be able to model explicitly the values included in the reciprocity equations. And
we can’t, can we? We do not yet know how to design an explicit yardstick that
makes the values of freedoms, authorities, power-application practices, and secu-
rities commensurable. Here, economics has so great an advantage over, e.g., the
legal, political, anthropological, and theological disciplines, that non-economic
arguments draw little attention in a political discourse nowadays.20
This phenomenon — the intrinsic non-quantifyability of some value types
— induces some wonderful reactions. Wittgenstein-I argued not to speak about
19 See for a related approach Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity, New York: Basic
Books 2000.
20 Except when focused on fundamentalist behavior.
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them, as we cannot know what we cannot quantify and as we better not speak
about what we do not know. Later, he retracted this position. However, the
Wittgenstein-I approach has proven to be very alluring in practice. It fits, for in-
stance, common attitudes in both econometrics and informatics. As they cannot
process non-quantifiable or unknown information, they tend to deny or underes-
timate its value and relevance. Kaplan and Shavell’s Fairness versus Welfare21 is
an interesting point in case. They claim that if fairness has value at all, it should
be made part of economic modelling and that considering the value of fairness
outside these models will lead to sub-optimal welfare. Their slogan might be:
what we cannot quantify is bad. In my opinion this proposition has a strong
family likeness to the proposition that we better refrain form speaking about
things we cannot quantify or know. A more consistent approach seems to me to
rephrase these propositions in a manner that has a smaller tendency to place
the discipline involved in the center of the world, which would presumably be a
better place when economists refrained from speaking about values they cannot
handle in their theories in stead of suggesting that these values are nonexistent,
not important or inefficient, and when computer-service designers would refrain
from speaking about values they cannot handle in their programs in stead of
suggesting that these values are nonexistent, not important or inefficient. Let
me quote Bruno Frey here: “This ‘new market orthodoxy’ by far stretches the
limits in which the price system is an effective and useful social decision-making
mechanism (. . . ) It is indeed neither possible nor desirable to build a society
solely or even mainly on monetary incentives — nor, of course, on commands
and regulations.”22
Still, as a refutation against the proposition that computers ought to adju-
dicate if they can, these considerations are beside the point because they are
outside our domain of discourse, as it is our working hypothesis that future re-
search will result either (i) in specifying a form of commensurability of relevant
values or (ii) in gaining some other effective approach to superior adjudication
results, as part of the then available capabilities that will support computers to
adjudicate in a better way than humans.
5.4 The Naturalistic Fallacy: an Unavoidable Trap?
There is a rather serious philosophical and very general refutation against the
proposition that computers ought to adjudicate. It concerns the so-called natu-
ralistic fallacy (the is-ought derivation problem) and reads as follows. Scientific
knowledge concerns what is. What ought to be cannot be derived from scien-
tific knowledge. If we know enough to make computers behave in a manner
that outperforms judges, they will necessarily process knowledge (propositions)
into norms (prescriptions). Computers that adjudicate thus cannot escape the
naturalistic-fallacy trap. Is this a serious refutation attempt? Does the argument
not as easily apply to human judges, too?
21 Louis Kaplan and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, Harvard Law Review
2001.
22 Bruno S. Frey, o.c., p. 2.
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We observe actual behavior that can be understood to domesticate rationally
the manipulation of mathematically incommensurable values all the time. But
then we are not in the realm of science, but in real life, employing practical rea-
soning. As any chess-player may corroborate, people seem to succeed in making
choices and decisions about values they cannot measure, concerning issues they
can only know partially — even under time-constraint time constraints. They
often even enjoy it. Ask any individual to come up with “grades” between 1
and 10, expressing the “statesmanship” of the current prime minister and the
current leader of the opposition — and he/she will do so with pleasure and
within seconds. Apparently, individuals are quite capable to make complex sets
of values commensurable, even in situations where they may not be aware of the
yardstick(s) they employ (if at all).
In chess, we tend to categorize this type of knowledge as “intuition,” in law we
frame it as “opinion.” Opinions and intuitions are individual; we experience them
as an inalienable part of our personalities, our identities even. Van den Herik’s
Ph.D. thesis challenged De Groot’s opinion that intuition in chess cannot be
modeled.23
Opinions do not have much scientific weight, at least at first sight. Neverthe-
less they are important for the sciences, as assumptions about their collective
functionalities make out the foundations, where our scientific notions of wel-
fare functions (the invisible hand is the result of aggregated opinions) and of
democracy (as elections are a matter of aggregated opinions) are built upon.
Opinions are special. They require individual autonomy, that is: freedom to act
and responsibility for the consequences. In practice, opinions solve some serious
problems for the social sciences. No social science has ever gotten very far on
any path to predict individual preferential behavior.24 This may be of some rel-
evance if we accept that adjudication comes in the form of opinions. We (legal
scientists) delegate those individual choices that add up to the level of fairness of
our societies to those individuals we trust and we shield them with constitutional
independence (i.e., freedom) to choose. I suggest that
– if economic science relies on the assumption that optimal welfare is function-
ally related to opinions (the freedom to choose in the market) and
– if political science relies on the assumption that optimal governance is func-
tionally related to opinions (the democratic freedom to elect those that gov-
ern) it may well be that
– legal science relies on the assumption that optimal adjudication, as an im-
portant facilitator of a fair society, is functionally related to opinions (the
constitutionally independent freedom of members of the judiciary to decide
conflicts).
23 At that time (1983) Van den Herik did not state that intuition can be modeled, but
he stated (1) maybe it can be incorporated implicitly in a computer program, since
it is inherent in the knowledge, or (2) maybe intuition is not a necessary ingredient
for a computer program to play at world-championship level.
24 Economists like Kenneth Arrow even get stuck in the observation that individual
preferences show inconsistency.
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To my own considerable amazement I have thus stumbled upon the obser-
vation that all three basic assumptions mentioned are the result of operational
naturalistic fallacies: if what is optimal is considered good, while what is opti-
mal is caused by factual choice, then all three assumptions mentioned include
an is-ought derivation. Consequently, these assumptions are contestable as they
employ the naturalistic fallacy. There is no room for pointing at the axiomatic
status of opinions in our judicial arrangements and deny the deontic possibilities
of computers because of the naturalistic fallacy implied. The axiomatic status of
opinions in our existing legal arrangements proves to be very much contestable
itself as it firmly rests on the same fallacy. My earlier misgivings about discussing
dangerous questions are coming true, so it seems. Taking the naturalistic-fallacy
argument serious implies that neither judges nor computers are fit to adjudicate.
I suggest facing the argument squarely and arguing the naturalistic-fallacy
argument not to be a serious refutation at all. After all, it shows what we knew
all along — that it may be true that we cannot derive what is right from what
is. So what? The observation is hardly ever relevant as (outside science and
mathematics) derivation is hardly ever possible or required. We need not take
the naturalistic fallacy argument serious because it is beside the point. There is
no or hardly ever any derivation involved in adjudication.
6 Conclusions
The argumentation leaves us with the conclusion that we have not found any
compelling argument against the proposition that computers ought to adjudicate
as soon as they perform consistently better that human judges. This result is
not conclusive, of course, as there may be many other and possibly worthier
refutations. It nevertheless is an attempt that does not weaken the proposition.
The foregoing discussion of the normative side of Van den Herik’s proposition
has brought two interesting issues to the fore, I think. One is the co-relation
that seems to exist between the growth of knowledge and the diminishing of free
space for rational choice. The second one is the observation that derivability is
not required for quality adjudication. Both issues merit additional attention.
6.1 The Growth of Knowledge and the Loss of Freedom
I consider adjudication to be a professional activity. This implies, that it is
performed by agents that know as much as can be known about their domain,
yet need not know enough to claim that they are able to predict the outcome of
any question within their domain. This implies that as more knowledge becomes
available, fewer questions with unpredictable outcomes remain. I consider this
correlation to be of importance when looking at adjudicatory trends. In general,
I suggest that where the room for “free,” creative solutions becomes smaller,
parts of the professional status (or glamour) may be influenced. There are several
examples in adjudication.
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– In the USA, in 1986, we have seen that the reduction of the free space for cre-
ative professional sentencing adjudication was diminished by the legislator,
by law, introducing quite rigid sentencing guidelines. These guidelines were
considered necessary when (statistic) information became available about
the ways the judiciary employed their (former) freedom to adjudicate sen-
tences for criminal acts. They consistently discriminated black criminals. As
this was considered unacceptable, professional leeway was reduced drasti-
cally. This reduction of professional autonomy was motivated by distrust of
(human) professional integrity.
– In the Netherlands, in the 1990s, the so-called Mulder Act changed profes-
sional freedom in a totally different manner: it was decided that the “lighter”
traffic felonies no longer would be decided by judges, but would be decided
in an automatic, administrative process. Thus reducing the adjudicatory do-
main diminished the professional freedom. The reason was, of course, that
the amount of traffic felonies clogged up the legal system. This reduction
shows that an economic argument concerning mass litigation may push the
transition from human towards computer adjudication.
– In the Netherlands, in the 1980s, the continuous flood of cassation appeals
on sentencing and sentencing motivation bothered the Supreme Court. A
line of work was chosen, wherein these appeals were rejected in a very much-
shortened procedure and without other motivation than a reference to estab-
lished policy. This was considered to be against the requirement of decent
feedback (motivation, explanation) in both the Dutch constitution and in
the European Convention on Human Rights. Subsequently, a formal Act
was passed, validating this practice. The reduction shows, that there may
be some areas of professional freedom the profession itself does not want to
keep and even manages to eliminate.
These examples suggest that there are at least three possible forces that re-
duce the professional freedom to adjudicate: (i) the way this freedom is exercised
is considered below par by the legislator who applies its jurisdiction to reduce
it, (ii) the sheer mass of litigations forces the adoption of uniform policies on
economic grounds and (iii) the establishment of a fixed adjudicatory policy re-
duces the need (and motivation) for professional attention. All three forces work
towards enlarging the possibilities for computers to adjudicate. As the reduction
of professional adjudicatory freedom will reduce the authority of the established
judiciary organization, it may well be that a balancing force can be found in the
reluctance of the legal discipline to follow the path towards the growth of knowl-
edge as referred to in footnote 3. Non-derivability supports the need for and the
status of professionals. This may lead to the strange situation that adjudicatory
knowledge will be acquired mainly by non-legal disciplines (like anthropology,
sociology and economy). This may also explain why adjudicatory practice is be-
coming more and more the subject of serious competition by alternative (even
online) conflict-resolution organizations.
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6.2 Derivability and Quality Adjudication
The distinction of the adjudicatory domain into a predictable and an unpre-
dictable sub-domain raises questions about the meaning of “quality adjudica-
tion.” Let us assume that the reciprocity equations mentioned earlier have been,
are, and will be effective for the sub-domain that is predictable. Then, we may
assume that those adjudications that in fact diverge from the predictable have
low quality. These adjudications do occur under human adjudication. The Roger
King case comes to mind, for example. Thus I tend to conclude that computers
ought to adjudicate in predictable sub-domains. As of now.25
6.3 Afterthought
The foregoing shows the fate that hits every effort in Artificial Intelligence. As
soon as tasks that require intelligence become within the reach of, say, intelligent
agents, they seem to become mere Information Technology. A side effect is often,
that AI efforts successfully expose some emperor’s new suit to be less glamorous
than before. No reason for Artificial Intelligence to despair, though. As soon as
it becomes acceptable that computers ought to adjudicate in predictable sub-
domains, the question might be raised whether computers can legislate.
25 The traditional argument against this opinion refers to all those seminal cases against
established practice. An example would be the Dutch Supreme Court ruling of 1921,
wherein was decided that the “theft” of electricity was possible, although the Dutch
Criminal Code only considered theft of tangible objects a crime. I do not think much
would have been lost when the Court had kept to the established policy. It would
have induced the legislator to mend its ways and it would have prevented the Court
to “legislate” in a non-democratic procedure.
